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Everyone is talking about China’s currency, it seems. 
Amidst months of building tension, there is an apparent 
consensus among most economists, the financial press, and 
leading economic policy makers in the West that the 
renminbi is hugely undervalued, making China’s exports 
unfairly competitive. The global imbalances created by 
such ‘mercantilist’ and ‘protectionist’ exchange rate 
strategies, it is argued, have been a central cause of global 
financial instability. China must therefore revalue, for the 
good of both itself and the world.1  
In particular, this position has been spearheaded by 
leading economic commentators such as Paul Krugman, 
Fred Bergsten or Martin Wolf, who have called for 
aggressive action against China on this issue. More 
diplomatically, it has also been advanced by what might be 
called a ‘G20 consensus’ of leading central bankers and 
finance ministers.2 It is with this logic that 130 members of 
the US Congress called on the Obama administration in 
March 2010 to label China a ‘currency manipulator’, 
which would then allow for other punitive measures to be 
taken against China.  
Yet, despite the consensus, in early April the US 
government postponed its report on international exchange 
rates due for 15 April and took a more conciliatory 
approach. Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, 
acknowledged two days before the US-China summit on 
24 May that China has made progress in rebalancing its 
economy towards domestic consumption and away from 
exports even though its currency remains pegged to the 
dollar.3 Given expectations that China’s currency will be an 
important election issue in the US, why did this apparent 
capitulation occur so easily? 
Despite the sense of absolute certainty emanating from 
revaluation advocates, reality is far more complex than they 
suggest. Indeed, China’s trade surplus reflects the strength 
of corporate America (and Europe and Japan) as that of 
China. Moreover, revaluation advocates argue that 
currency appreciation should happen through nominal 
revaluation, rather than only through real appreciation. 
This logic is best understood as reflective of speculative 
interests and detrimental to the developmental interests of 
China given that it would forfeit China’s ability to 
appreciate through gradually rising wages, contrary to the 
claims of those leading the debate in the West.  
 
Is the renminbi undervalued?  
Similar to the previous crescendo in this debate in 2005, 
there is actually no agreement as to whether the renminbi 
is undervalued or by how much. Revaluation advocates 
generally maintain that the answer to this question is self-
evident by virtue of China’s very large trade surpluses. In 
March 2010, economists at the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics in Washington claimed that the 
renminbi is undervalued by about 25 per cent on a trade-
weighted average basis, and by about 40 per cent against 
the US dollar, based on assumptions of how much 
revaluation would be required to reduce China’s current 
account surplus to 3-4 per cent of GDP. They also suggest 
that China’s currency policy is half as market-oriented as in 
2005 given that its foreign exchange interventions are 
about twice as great today (about $30-40 billion per 
month) as then ($15-20 billion per month).4 
However, the issue is much more complex. Invariably, 
wide ranges of estimates can be obtained, depending on 
definitions and assumptions. Hence, prominent 
economists or institutions such as the IMF estimate that 
the renminbi is much less undervalued, if at all, or instead, 
that the US dollar is overvalued.  
Notably, China’s trade surplus in goods exploded from 
around 3 per cent of its GDP in 2004 to a peak of over 9 
per cent in 2007. At the same time, the government 
allowed the renminbi to appreciate against the US dollar 
by over 20 per cent from July 2005 to July 2008, which 
should have reduced China’s surplus with the US, not 
increased it. This suggests that the surpluses have borne 
little relation to the valuation of the Chinese currency. 
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Revaluation advocates have retorted that the renminbi was 
so undervalued that much more revaluation is needed. 
More sophisticated versions of this argument contend that 
other intervening factors, such as interest rate differentials, 
have prevented renminbi revaluation from inducing the 
necessary adjustments.5 
In the midst of the squabble, Prime Minister of China 
Wen Jiabao asserted in March 2010 that the renminbi is 
not undervalued, a claim ridiculed by many in the Western 
media. However, as if to prove Wen correct, the trade 
balance of China registered a deficit in March 2010 for the 
first time since April 2004, due to a sharp rise in imports 
and fewer exports of labour-intensive goods. While 
probably temporary, this dip nonetheless underlines that 




The revaluation advocates generally ignore the nature of 
China’s integration into networks controlled by 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Foreign funded 
enterprises accounted for 58 per cent of China’s exports 
and imports in 2005, or even more if their subcontracting 
arrangements with locally-owned firms are included within 
a wider understanding of these networks dominated by 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Hence, revaluation is 
unlikely to have much effect on the competitiveness of 
Chinese exports because so much of the inputs for these 
exports are imported (and priced as intra-firm transfers), 
cancelling out the potential effect of any currency 
movement.7  
Another important dimension is the financial account 
given that capital flows have a huge bearing on currency 
valuations. For instance, the Financial Times admitted in a 
recent editorial that estimates of undervaluation vary 
massively in part because of movements on the capital 
account. If freed, these could lead to a flood of capital 
outflows that might temporarily push the renminbi down 
instead of up.8 These concerns are particularly pertinent 
given the huge resurgence of carry trading in East Asia 
since autumn 2009, which dwarfs China’s surpluses and 
reserves many times over. 
However, the TNC dimensions of such financial 
dynamics are rarely explored. For example, TNC transfer 
pricing practices, which are used for intra-firm transfers 
within the TNC networks that dominate China’s trade, are 
also often used for avoiding taxes or capital controls.9 
Hence, much of the trade account might actually represent 
capital movements. More generally, Chinese surpluses (and 
US deficits) could, in fact, represent the increased 
profitability of US companies operating in the global 
market.10 As a result, the real significance of the trade data 
must be examined with much caution. False evaluations on 
the basis of such trade data can ironically serve to justify 
attempts to further subordinate China within these TNC 
networks. Indeed, Tim Geithner suggested that recent US 
conciliation towards China is related to Beijing's relaxation 
of some of the restrictions facing TNCs, such as 
‘indigenous innovation’ rules introduced in 2009, which 
US corporations claimed would exclude them from public 
procurement contracts.11 In other words, the currency 
confrontation might well be a bargaining chip for other 
strategic issues. 
The disjuncture between currency appreciation and 
rising trade surpluses is also partly explained by rising 
productivity, which compensates for currency appreciation 
by lowering unit-labour costs. While China’s success in 
this respect has caused it to be blamed for its 
overenthusiastic interventionist industrial policies, it is also 
important to ask; how was the consumption of its surpluses 
guaranteed? 
Evaluation of international balance of payments data 
actually suggests the opposite of what the revaluation 
advocates claim. Arguably, financialization in the US drove 
consumption and deficits in the US. In turn, these drove 
China’s high levels of investment, thereby buttressing its 
industrial policies and surpluses. This alternative 
explanation is supported by the fact that China’s trade 
surplus only really took off in the mid-2000s, several years 
after the US current account deficit started to massively 
increase following the East Asian crisis in 1997-98 and 
several years after a huge surge in net foreign direct and 
other investment into China from about 2001 to 2005. 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 obviously had some 
influence on these dynamics, although merely as an 
institutional facilitator of the more systemic rerouting of 
TNC-dominated production networks through China that 
followed the East Asian crisis.12 
 
Nominal or real revaluation? 
Many argue that China must nonetheless adjust to its de 
facto surplus and that this is better planned rather than 
brought about through instability or crises. However, 
adjustment can take many forms.  
Revaluation advocates generally argue that adjustment 
needs to happen through nominal revaluation. This, it is 
argued, is essential to rebalance the economy towards more 
domestic demand and consumption by making imports 
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cheaper, thereby raising real incomes, and by penalising 
exporters against those producing for the domestic market. 
This should again dampen inflation in China by lowering 
the cost of imports in domestic consumption. Some also 
add that revaluation would reduce the inflationary 
tendencies generated by large surpluses. 
However, if the argument for revaluation holds any 
water, it would apply to real exchange rates, not necessarily 
nominal exchange rates (unless these follow the former, 
which is not always the case).13 Let us assume that China’s 
trade account would rebalance if its real exchange rate 
appreciates. This could take place directly through nominal 
revaluation, although the effects might be offset by a 
variety of speculative movements on the income and 
financial accounts. Alternatively, real appreciation can take 
place through higher prices or wage/cost inflation relative 
to trade partners or competitors. Indeed, this is happening 
now; price inflation in China is currently higher than in 
the US and upward wage pressures in China contrast with 
stagnant, if not falling wages in the US. Hence, real 
appreciation is already taking place, a point which Beijing 
sometimes makes. 
This helps to clarify the developmental predicament of 
revaluation. Gradual real appreciation through rising wages 
would offer an ideal way of increasing domestic 
consumption and rebalancing the economy. Moreover, as a 
relatively poor developing country, rising real wages in 
China would contribute to the goals of economic 
development. China can do this now since its surplus 
position can serve as a substantial buffer against possible 
adverse balance of payments consequences due to rising 
real wages. 
In contrast, nominal revaluation would effectively 
forfeit China’s ability to adjust in this way, by abdicating 
the role of wages to the role of international prices. In 
other words, the option of using its surpluses and reserves 
in a developmental manner would be abandoned in 
deference to rewarding speculators and market arbitrage. 
Moreover, nominal revaluation would probably 
exacerbate the squeeze on wages as export-oriented and 
import-competing enterprises would respond by 
attempting to lower unit-wage costs. Indeed, this tendency 
has been observed since 2005 and would have exacerbated 
the low share of consumption to GDP, opposite to what 
the revaluation advocates argue. Nominal revaluation 
would also place downward pressure on agricultural 
incomes by depressing farm gate prices. This 
developmental dimension is lacking in most of the current 
mainstream Western debates on China’s currency, even 
though many Chinese economists argue precisely along 
these lines. Their logic is imminently sensible. 
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